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ABSTRACT: In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argues both that certain propositions belong to our “frame of 
reference” and are “exempt from doubt,” and that this “river-bed of thoughts” can change. Exploring this 
seeming contradiction, I argue that such changes can take place as the result of rational argumentation, 
although of a highly indirect nature, and suggest that something like this can hold for argumentation 
between cultures. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A typical argument for relativism goes something like this: 
 
(1) Systems of beliefs (cultures, scientific paradigms, traditions, etc.) contain less 
fundamental and more fundamental parts. The most fundamental parts are those 
which one cannot question without indirectly questioning the entire system of 
beliefs. For instance, the assumption that the earth is the centre of the planetary 
system was a fundamental part of Ptolemaian astronomy, and the law of gravity of 
Newton’s physics. 
 (2) The most fundamental parts of a system of beliefs can only be critically 
assessed, if at all, on the basis of something even more fundamental —  some 
evidence which is valid independently of any particular system of beliefs; a 
paradigm- and tradition-neutral “Archimedean point.” 
(3) However, there exists no such “Archimedean point”; all evidence is dependent 
on some system of beliefs. 
(4) Therefore, the most fundamental beliefs within a system of beliefs cannot be 
critically and rationally assessed in any way. Consequently, what determines 
whether those fundamental presuppositions are accepted or not, is not a process of 
rational argument, but rather social and psychological factors.  
 
Thomas Kuhn’s highly influential The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is one 
source of such arguments (although Kuhn himself does not consider himself a relativist).  
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A typical “objectivist” response is to question premise (3) and try to show that, 
after all, some propositions, observational data, values, principles of logic or truths of 
mathematics are valid independently of all particular system of beliefs. Drawing on some 
themes in Wittgenstein's On Certainty, I would like to instead question premise (2). More 
precisely, I will explore the idea that the most fundamental parts of a system of beliefs 
can be critically assessed on the basis of less fundamental parts. It seems to me that 
Wittgenstein’s argument for this somewhat paradoxical claim indicates a possible 
analysis of the structure of systems of beliefs which transcends the ordinary objectivism-
relativism dichotomy and provides new perspectives on the possibility of discussion and 
dialogue between cultures, paradigms, and other traditions, and of the possibility of 
revising beliefs within one’s own tradition, or system of beliefs, as the result of such 
discussion.  
 
2. WITTGENSTEIN’S ON CERTAINTY 
 
Consider the following passage from On Certainty (henceforth referred to as ”OC”): 
 
If a blind man were to ask me “Have you got two hands?” I should not make sure by looking. If I 
were to have any doubt of it, then I don’t know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn’t I 
test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what? 
(Who decides what stands fast?) (OC, p. 125) 
 
Normally, observational data function as fundamental parts of our system of beliefs, in 
the sense that other, inferential and theoretical beliefs are tested by their agreement with 
observational data. Sometimes, however, the logical order gets turned around, and 
presumed observational data are tested by their agreement with well-established 
theoretical assumptions. If we observe or think we observe something which contradict 
our most well established theories, we question the observational data rather than the 
theories: we assume that the observer made a mistake, that there was an error in the 
instruments, or that some disturbing factor interfered with the observation. In fact, 
something very similar is one of Thomas Kuhn’s argument for the non-existence of an 
“Archimedean point”; if scientists are confronted with observational evidence which 
contradicts their paradigm, they can—legitimately—question the evidence rather than the 
paradigm.  
Wittgenstein’s remark about the hand and the eyes occurs in a discussion of 
George Edward Moore’s attempt to disprove scepticism about the external world by 
simply holding up his two hands, saying “Here is a hand,” and “Here is another,” and 
concluding that at least two external objects exist and that the existence of many others 
can be proved in the same way. (Moore 1939) Thus, Moore seems to provide an 
objectivist reply to scepticism, which could also be a reply to relativism: there are pieces 
of observational evidence the validity of which is independent on inferential and 
theoretical assumptions, and therefore independent of any particular system of beliefs. In 
his discussion of Moore’s anti-sceptical argument, Wittgenstein argues both that Moore’s 
argument is mistaken for fairly obvious reasons, and that, nevertheless, there is 
something fundamentally right about it. 
Wittgenstein points out that Moore’s alleged proof presupposes what the sceptic 
questions, namely, that his eyes, or visual perception, are reliable under the 
circumstances. If the reliability of my eyes, nerves and visual centra in the brain is 
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presupposed, I may question the existence of my hands and use my eyes to ascertain that 
they are there. But I can also question the trustworthiness of the eyes and, presupposing 
the existence of the hands, use them to check the eyes; if I see the hand in the normal 
way, I infer that my eyes are all right, but if I see something extremely improbable, such 
as live snakes crawling out of holes in the hand where my fingers used to be, then I 
conclude that for some reason my apparatus of visual perception is not functioning 
properly. The presupposition of the first inquiry can thus be made the object of another 
critical inquiry, in which that which was questioned in the first inquiry is presupposed 
and treated as unproblematic. (As an exegetical point, it may be noted here that 
Wittgenstein is reluctant to talk of “presuppositions”— see for instance OC, p. 153.) 
On Certainty contains reflections on knowledge, certainty, and doubt. 
Wittgenstein distinguishes a core of what (in OC, p. 96) he calls “hardened” propositions 
from propositions that are not hardened but “fluid.” The former, he claims, are “exempt 
from doubt” (OC, p. 88 and other remarks); one “cannot doubt” them. (OC, pp. 331, 394) 
Among these are “My name is L. W.,” “I have two hands” and “Water boils at 100°C.”  
 
We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition, how the 
letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human beings 
have blood and call it ‘blood’. (OC, p. 340) 
  
One’s attitude towards such propositions can be expressed by one’s saying “‘Nothing in 
the world will convince me of the opposite!’ For me this fact is at the bottom of all 
knowledge. I shall give up other things but not this” (OC, p. 380). 
The exemptness from doubt of hardened propositions shows itself, among other 
things, in the way evidence against them is treated. 
 
If something happened (such as someone telling me something) calculated to make me doubtful of 
my own name, there would certainly also be something that made the grounds of these doubts 
themselves seem doubtful, and I could therefore decide to retain my old belief. (OC, p. 516) 
 
Despite their indubitability, however, Wittgenstein does not think of the hardened 
propositions as constituting anything like an “Archimedean point.” On the contrary, he 
argues that they are “groundless” in a way that sets them off from the supposedly 
paradigm-neutral observational data or culturally neutral values, and he recognises that—
paradoxically—mistakes about them are imaginable despite their indubitability. 
Wittgenstein talks about “the groundlessness of our believing” (OC, p. 166) and 
states that “justification comes to an end.” (OC, p. 192. Cf. also OC pp. 212, 563, and 
other remarks) “The language-game,” he says, “is not based on grounds. It is not 
reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there— like our life.” (OC, p. 559) In other words, 
there can be no justification for our system of common sense beliefs as a whole, no 
“proof of an external world.”  
 
But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it 
because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I 
distinguish between true and false. (OC, p. 94) 
 
 ‘We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we could not doubt them all.’ Wouldn’t it be 
more correct to say: ‘we do not doubt them all’. Our not doubting them all is simply our manner of 
judging, and therefore of acting. (OC, p. 232) 
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In P. F. Strawson’s words, the propositions (or beliefs, or quasi-beliefs) belonging to the 
“frame of reference,” or “world-picture,” are “outside our critical and rational 
competence in the sense that they define, or help to define, the area in which that 
competence is exercised” (Strawson 1985, p. 19). 
Despite this, Wittgenstein maintains that the possibility of mistakes about 
hardened propositions cannot be excluded.  
 
Would it not be possible that people came into my room and all declared the opposite [of the 
proposition ‘I am now living in England’]?—even gave me ‘proofs’ of it, so that I suddenly stood 
there like a madman alone among people who were all normal, or a normal person alone among 
madmen? Might I not then suffer doubts about what at present seems at the furthest remove from 
doubt? (OC, p. 420) 
 
 If someone tells me his name is N. N., it is meaningful for me to ask him ‘Can you be mistaken?’ 
That is an allowable question in the language-game. And the answer to it, yes or no, makes sense. 
—  Now of course this answer is not infallible either, i.e., there might be a time when it proved to 
be wrong […] (OC, p. 596) 
 
In sum, Wittgenstein maintains a position which differs from both objectivism and 
relativism as ordinarily conceived. An objectivist might argue against relativism that 
certain propositions are impossible to be mistaken about. A relativist might argue against 
objectivism that systems of beliefs are groundless and that mistakes about them are 
possible (at least, that is, if the notion of a mistake can be made sense of without any 
particular system of beliefs being assumed). However, maintaining both that “hardened” 
propositions are indubitable, groundless, and fallible seems incompatible with both 
positions in this dispute. But perhaps the solution of the problem lies precisely in such a 
third position “beyond objectivism and relativism.” (Cf. Bernstein 1983) If so, 
Wittgenstein’s analysis may provide useful clues. 
In what follows, I will I argue  
 
(i) that the possibility of mistakes about hardened proposition, despite their 
indubitability, is a consequence of Wittgenstein’s explanation of how and 
why hardened propositions are exempt from doubt, 
(ii) that another consequence of the same analysis is that systems of beliefs can 
change as the result of rational argumentation, although of a highly indirect 
nature, and that consequently 
(iii) the groundlessness of hardened propositions does not exclude the possibility 
of rational argumentation about them between cultures.  
 
If I am right, Wittgenstein’s analysis indicates a way to reconcile insights from relativist 
arguments like those of Kuhn with a rejection of relativism itself. 
 
3. SYSTEMS OF BELIEFS, MISTAKE, AND CHANGE IN BELIEF 
 
My first claim is thus that the possibility of mistakes about hardened propositions is—
somewhat paradoxically—a consequence of Wittgenstein’s explanation of how and why 
such propositions are exempt from doubt. An important theme in On Certainty is that 
“[a]ll testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already 
 4
THE DYNAMICS OF BELIEF SYSTEMS  
within a system” (OC, p. 105), and the absence of doubt with regard to hinge propositions 
has to do with their special role in this system of beliefs. 
 
Experience can be said to teach us these propositions [that if someone’s arm or head is cut off, it 
will not grow again]. However, it does not teach us them in isolation: rather, it teaches us a host of 
interdependent propositions. If they were isolated I might perhaps doubt them […] (OC, p. 274) 
 
If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Not 
merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole 
system of physics forbids us to believe it. For this demands answers to the questions ‘How did he 
overcome the force of gravity?’ ‘How could he live without an atmosphere?’ and a thousand 
others which could not be answered. (OC, p. 108)  
 
Wittgenstein also remarks that if someone questioned my belief that my name is such—
and—such, then “[…] I should straightaway make connexions with innumerable things 
which make it certain.” (OC, p. 594). For example, I would point to the facts that I have 
had that name my whole life and that everybody has called me by it (OC, p. 598). 
One implication of this is that hardened propositions are fundamental to our 
system of beliefs in a way that other propositions are not; it is a characteristic of a 
hardened proposition that, if it were doubted, then the entire system of beliefs would be 
indirectly affected by the doubt.  
 
But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N. N., whom I have known for years? 
Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos. That is to say: If I 
were contradicted on all sides and told that this person’s name was not what I had always known it 
was (and I use ‘know’ here intentionally), then in that case the foundation of all judging would be 
taken away from me. (OC, pp. 613-614) 
 
Giving up a hardened proposition is thus in effect to give up our whole system of beliefs: 
“I cannot depart from this judgment without toppling all other judgments with it.” (OC, p. 
419)  
Why, then, are hardened propositions excluded from doubt? The reason is not that 
they are based on something more fundamental or certain—as we have seen, 
Wittgenstein maintains that they are groundless—but rather that they are supported by 
other propositions. These, in turn, are not beyond doubt 
 
Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand 
unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it 
is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it. (OC, p. 144) 
 
I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently 
like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it 
fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility. (OC, p. 152) 
 
The second of my three claims above was that this analysis implies that hardened 
propositions, and thereby entire systems of beliefs, can change as the result of rational 
argumentation despite the fact that there is nothing more fundamental than the hardened 
propositions which can constitute evidence for or against them. If hardened propositions 
are excluded from doubt by the fact that they are “held fast” by other, “fluid” 
propositions, then if the fluid propositions on which a certain hardened proposition 
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depends (and which depend on it) are given up, then the latter can change its status and 
become fluid, open to questioning in the same way as other empirical propositions. 
 
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened 
and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and 
that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river—bed of thoughts may shift. (OC, 
pp. 96- 97) 
 
Apparently without intending to do so, Wittgenstein provides a striking example, namely, 
the proposition “I have never been on the moon.” Writing around 1950, Wittgenstein 
considers this a matter beyond doubt and impossible to be mistaken about. His 
explanation of why this is so is in accordance with his analysis of the relation between 
the indubitable and the dubitable. 
 
Our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it. For this demands answers to the questions 
‘How did he overcome the force of gravity?’ ‘How could he live without an atmosphere?’ and a 
thousand others which could not be answered. (OC, p. 108) 
 
Today, developments in physics and technology have provided answers to these 
questions, and the proposition “No-one has been on the moon” is no longer indubitable. 
Thus, the indubitability of hardened propositions is relative to one’s present system of 
beliefs, so that if one revises that system (in ways that one cannot now predict), then what 
is now indubitable may become open to doubt. (Wittgenstein seems to be implying this 
when, reflecting on the possibility of doubts concerning one’s having two hands, he says 
that “So far I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist” (OC, p. 247, my 
emphasis)). 
The last of my three claims above was that the groundlessness of hardened 
propositions does not exclude the possibility of rational argumentation about them 
between cultures. Indeed, it seems to me that Wittenstein’s analysis suggests an 
explanation of how there can be critical inquiry—of a highly indirect kind—concerning 
the things that “stand fast” for us. If the special status of hardened propositions depends 
on other, fluid propositions within the system of beliefs, and if these can be subjected to 
doubt and investigation and be revised in the light of empirical evidence, then, it seems, 
one can argue rationally against a hardened proposition in an indirect way, namely, by 
presenting evidence against the fluid propositions that “hold it fast.” For example, it 
seems quite conceivable that someone should have presented plans for a space vessel to 
Wittgenstein which would have convinced him that the proposition “I have never been on 
the moon” was not indubitable after all, at least not for the reasons he mentions.  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
What all this suggests, I think, is an understanding of the logical structure of systems of 
beliefs similar to Thomas Kuhn’s theory of the development of scientific paradigms, only 
without the relativistic idea that paradigm shifts cannot be processes of rational 
argumentation. In periods of normal science, the core elements of the paradigm “stand 
fast,” so that any contradiction between paradigm-induced predictions and actual 
observations are ascribed to the influence of disturbing factors, malfunctions in 
measuring instruments, etc. However, in periods of scientific revolution, the paradigm 
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itself becomes questioned and alternatives are searched for. When a received paradigm is 
given up, it is not a simple matter of disproving it; that would require a basis of 
paradigm-neutral observations or theoretical principles. However, this does not mean that 
there cannot be reasons for giving it up, so that what happens must similar to a religious 
conversion, as Kuhn famously contends. (Kuhn 1970, chapter 12) It can, at least in 
principle, be a process of slow undermining of the paradigm, in which the “fluid” 
propositions which holds it in place as “hardened,” or beyond doubt, are questioned and 
revised in essentially the same way as those which once excluded from doubt the 
proposition “No-one has ever been on the moon.” For instance, the geocentric hypothesis 
in astronomy would not be directly falsified by simple observation of planetary orbits; 
instead, what takes place is a much more indirect process of critically questioning, one by 
one, crucial presuppositions in the arguments for geocentrism, such as underlying 
presuppositions about the laws of motion. And something very similar, I surmise, can 
take place in the case of cultural, non-scientific traditions. 
 
         Link to commentary 
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